HCWs
We defined an HCW as a person who has worked in >1 of the 3 West African countries in a capacity related to providing care to Ebola patients. The monthly rate of new HCW infections (main text, Table: Input 3) in West Africa was calculated by dividing the monthly number of reported Ebola cases in HCWs (at different time points in the epidemic) by estimates of the total HCW population exposed as a result of staffing Ebola Treatment Units (ETUs) (Technical Appendix 1 Table 4 ) (1) . A lower estimate of the rate of infected HCWs in West Africa was calculated by using the 3-month average number of cases reported among HCWs at the midpoint of the outbreak (36/month, calculated July 2014) (Technical Appendix 1 Table 3 ) and the highest estimate of HCWs in the 3 West African countries (4,172 workers/1000 ETU beds) (Technical Appendix 1 Table 4 ). This number of HCWs assumes that all HCWs, regardless of their type of employment, are at higher risk than the general population for exposure to Ebola (Technical Appendix 1 Table 2 ). A higher estimate of the rate of infections among HCWs was calculated by using the maximum 3-month average infections among HCWs to date (129/month, calculated in October 2014) (Technical Appendix 1 Table 3 ), and the lowest HCW population at risk (2,677 workers/1,000 ETU beds) (Technical Appendix Table 2 ). This number of HCWs assumes that a smaller subset of staff, based on their position (i.e., those more likely to have patient encounters), are at higher risk for Ebola infection.
The arrival rate of HCWs to the United States was based on 1) the number of travelers who identified themselves as having worked in a health care facility during the previous 21 days and 2) the risk category ("high," "some," or "low") assigned to them during enhanced entry screening at their airport of entry to the United States during November 5-December 1, 2014 (2, 3) . The low estimate value of arrivals of HCWs (30 arrivals/month) was approximately the lowest rate of "high-" and "some-risk" HCWs entering the United States (main text 
Secondary Transmission
Secondary transmission may occur during the period in which a traveler is clinically ill but before he or she is placed in an isolated hospital bed. Some secondary transmission may also occur between the ill patient and the US-based HCWs treating the patient (4). The number of secondary transmissions per each HCW and non-HCW case imported to the United States was assumed to be either 0 (low estimate) or 2 (high estimate) (main text Table: Input 
Sensitivity Analysis: Length of Stay and Case-Fatality Rate
A sensitivity analysis of LOS was also conducted in which LOS were based on casepatients treated in the United States through November 2014. Although few in number (n = 10), case-patients treated in the United States could have longer average LOS of 22.4 days and improved survival of 80% (i.e., CFR 20%). Case-patients treated in West Africa had an average LOS of 14.8 days and CFR 40% cases treated in Africa (Technical Appendix 1 Table 6 ).
When data on LOS and survival were used from case-patients treated in the United States (in the sensitivity analysis) the low estimate was still 1, but the 95% CI widened slightly (95% CI 0-4). The high estimate increased from 7 cases to 12 cases (95% CI 5-19).
Comparison with Other Published Estimates
Our estimates are within the range of other published estimates (6, 7) . Using a similar, incidence-based risk calculation (based on incidence in September 2014), Bogoch et al. 
Limitations
The findings in this report are subject to several limitations. First, this analysis does not account for the possibility of the outbreak worsening in the future. If the incidence increases among the general population or HCWs, so would the rate of importations if air travel arrival rates remained the same. If Ebola becomes established in other countries (particularly those with many travelers to the United States) the rate of importation may also increase. However, our BED tool can be used to update and reestimate the risk for imported cases of Ebola. Second, this analysis does not specifically evaluate the effect of travel restrictions, such as reductions in airline traffic and capacity, and exit screenings (which could decrease the risk for travel by symptomatic persons or persons with higher exposure risks). Imposing reductions in air travel may not have a notable impact. Gomes et al. found that reducing air travel may delay importation only by a few weeks but not prevent or reduce the rate of importation (7) . Again, our BED tool can be used to explore the potential impact of a decrease or increase in the number of monthly arrivals from West Africa. Third, we assumed that secondary cases will be very limited and easy to contain, thus preventing further infections (i.e., no tertiary cases will occur). Fourth, the upper limit for the number of non-HCW travelers with Ebola was calculated by assuming that these travelers have a risk for infection equal to that of the general population in the 3 primarily affected West African countries. Because most travelers are likely to have a higher socioeconomic status than persons in the general population, and consequently, a lower risk for Ebola infection, this assumption most likely overestimates the risk for infection among travelers.
As an alternative (as noted in Appendix Data Inputs and Assumptions, General Travelers) we estimated in the lower limit calculation, the impact of assuming that travelers had a level of risk that is one third that of the general population in the 3 affected countries. This reduction in risk for infection among travelers, compared with the general population, may still overestimate the actual risk. Again, the BED tool can be used to explore the impact of assuming a different level of reduction in risk (either higher or lower than what we assumed Table 3 .) ETU, Ebola Treatment Unit; HCW, health care worker. †The number exposed was based on the type of HCWs working in ETUs (see Technical Appendix 1 Table 2 ). For the low estimate calculation, we considered all HCWs as exposed (i.e., the sum low-and high-risk personnel). The high estimate calculation was based on the high-risk personnel only, under the assumption that a smaller subset of staff, based on their position (i.e., those more likely to have patient encounters) are at higher risk for Ebola virus infection.
‡The total number of ETU beds at the end of October among the primarily affected countries of Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, unpub. data). §Output (rounded to the nearest whole number) = [(Input 1)/(Input 2/1000 × Input 3)] × 100.
Technical Appendix 1 *Based on the average interval from hospitalization to discharge + 1 SD; for survivors this was 11.8 d (SD 6.1), and for nonsurvivors it was 4.2 d (SD 6.4) (9). CFR, case-fatality rate; LOS, length of stay. †Survivors' LOS (during treatment at US hospitals only) (n = 8) was based on 19.4 d + 1 SD of 8.8. Nonsurvivors' LOS (during treatment in US hospitals only) (n = 2) was the maximum LOS from the observed range of 2-10 d. CFR was obtained from 2 deaths of 10 case-patients treated (see Technical Appendix 1 Table 6 ). ‡Weighted Average LOS = LOS for survivors × (1-CFR proportion) + LOS for nonsurvivors × CFR.
